On March 18, 1938, President Lázaro Cárdenas stepped in to end a lingering stalemate between foreign companies and oil workers by nationalizing Mexico's petroleum industry. After he read the decree aloud on the radio, news of the decision swept rapidly through the country and around the world. The date became synonymous with economic independence and revolutionary pride, and many people consider it the pinnacle of a presidency devoted to the redemption of the worker, the peasant, and the underprivileged. 1 The following day, Cárdenas made a far less spectacular gesture, yet one that revealed what we consider to be another, equally pivotal side of his presidency. He rose early, gathered his wife, children, and a few friends, and drove to Nevado de Toluca National Park. His wife later recalled that the president said he wanted to "rest and forget about things for awhile; that he didn't want to know what was going on and didn't want to see any newspapers." 2 In this planned escape, Cárdenas used a natural landscape as a refuge from the disordered world of city life and national politics. 3 Cárdenas himself had ordered the park's creation two years earlier, and his sojourn there reaffirmed the centrality of his 1 The literature on the petroleum nationalization is too vast to exhaustively list here. Major works include Gustavo Corona, Lázaro Cárdenas y la expropiación de la industria petrolera en México, 2d ed.
program of natural resources that included, but extended far beyond, oil. After a day of picnicking with his family, swimming in the alpine lakes, and hiking in the woods, Cárdenas returned to the city invigorated and refocused to face the nation and the world. 4 The juxtaposition of Cárdenas's nationalization of a strategic natural resource and his retreat to a newly created National Park encapsulates the sort of relationship between people and the natural world that the president hoped to promote during his 1934-1940 term. Cárdenas did not regard the environment as a mere storehouse of natural wealth that he could place at the disposal of rural communities and Mexican corporations. He also saw it as a privileged site for the promotion of the physical discipline of moral rejuvenation -that is, as a space that had multiple didactic possibilities. He and his followers conceived the environment as a potentially threatened part of the nation's patrimony, yet one whose proper use would ensure national development and social change. Indeed, a fundamental element of his ambitious social and political agenda was to rationalize and expand the use of natural resources in tandem with social reform. For a nation that was still overwhelmingly rural, this meant nothing short of reordering the relationship between nature and society through such measures as conservationist regulations, the creation of national parks, and a massive push to cooperativize work in the countryside. Land reform was undeniably a central component of this vision, but it constituted only one part of a far broader process we call "social landscaping" through which the Cardenistas sought to develop and conserve the nation's forests, waters, and land through the concomitant rationalization of the landscape and rural society itself. In a sense, the Cardenistas saw the environment as the setting for an immense public works project that would harness and stabilize the nation's resource endowment, provide labor for thousands of workers, and create the infrastructure necessary to make small-scale campesino production the engine of national development.
Historians are already familiar with the most spectacular components of Cárdenas's political project: an invigorated land reform process that broke the back of the landed elite and gave community land parcels known as ejidos to 800,000 rural families; a massive expansion of public education that featured a strong dose of moralizing anticlericalism (and often conservationism as well); state support for unions and other collective organizations linked to the ruling party; and the nationalization of the petroleum and other key industries. 5 But this essentially political understanding of the Cárdenas administration remains incomplete and partially distorted. Historians have not fully recognized the extent to which these policies entailed a state-managed transformation in the way that the popular classes made use of the environment.
We believe that the Cardenistas consciously initiated the process that we call "social landscaping" that made the rationalization of resource use and social reform two sides of the same coin. They accomplished this by enacting a series of mutually reinforcing social and ecological reforms intended to give rural communities greater control over natural resources but also placed them under the tutelage of experts. At the same time, Cardenistas drafted plans to reorganize and conserve the use of natural resources on a national scale in a manner that would simultaneously provide the raw material that a developing nation required and yet give rural communities a greater share of the wealth this process generated. This article begins by explaining the underpinnings of social landscaping, then turns to a discussion of the initiatives that Cardenistas either initiated or expanded in a bid to rationalize the use of nature and teach rural people to become efficient stewards of natural resources. Finally, we turn to forests, which were particularly privileged sites of social landscaping. More than any other ecosystem in the post-revolutionary landscape, forests seemed to promise that nature and peasant practices could be re-organized in ways that would not only protect delicate ecosystems, but spark development both on a national scale and within some of the nation's most marginalized communities.
Social Landscaping and Cardenismo
At its heart, Cardenista social landscaping was a state-driven process structured around the concomitant goals of modernizing the way that rural people understood nature, creating new efficiencies in the use of natural resources, and maximizing the economic viability of community production in rural areas. The relationship between labor and landscape has not been lost on environmental historians. Richard White has observed that most people historically have experienced nature by working within it. Workers on the Columbia River, he argues, have tended it like industrial workers tend a machine and thus "knew the river through the work the river demanded of them." 7 The Cardenista project also put people to work in nature, but the mechanism for doing so came not through the logic of the free market, nor even did it originate with a productivist model as in the United States. The Cardenistas self-consciously intended to create programs that both spurred development and sought to teach people about nature in White's sense. That is, they intentionally tried to (re)shape Mexicans' interactions with nature (while achieving other political and economic goals as well). Rather than putting people to work on a particular river, the Cardenistas operated on a national scale. They found new purposes for existing social programs and invented new ones that reached up rivers, down into the soil, and out to the tops of trees. They made unprecedented investments in road building, irrigation and dam construction, and the scientific study of resource use. We are not the first historians to remark on such processes. 8 Our contribution is to highlight the fundamental co-dependency between initiatives that aimed to organize and mobilize the popular classes, on the one hand, and the effort to rationalize and expand rural people's use of land, forest, water, and mineral wealth, on the other.
Social landscaping had conceptual, operational, and didactic elements. The conceptual framework -deciding where roads should run, how to teach peasants modern agricultural techniques, which forests should be logged, and so on -ultimately rested on the chiefs of federal departments involved in agriculture, water management, road-building, national parks, and forestry. Much of the actual operational work to carry these plans fell on a newly expanded network of experts empowered to design and build new public works projects and regulate the use of natural resources. Both the chiefs and the experts doused their programs in a moralizing discourse of didactic politics, adding instruction even where it was not needed or welcomed. And while the project of social landscaping did extend the state's reach into the countryside, a number of factors limited the expansion of bureaucratic power. In the first place, the small number of experts charged with carrying out the project relative to the task at hand limited their effectiveness. In the second, they encountered a popular class mobilized by years of upheaval and organized in institutions capable of making their own claims on state and natural resources, including ejidos, unions, cooperatives, and political organizations of various stripes. Finally, the project of social landscaping had to contend with the oftentimes-harsh ecology of the Mexican countryside, where water flowed either too little or too much, the sun baked the ground, and growing seasons were short and tenuous.
In some ways, social landscaping in Mexico paralleled other national experiences.
Environmental historians have observed that some modern states dramatically reshaped nature in the name of efficiency and development, often with devastating implications for their own citizens. James Scott, for example, has shown that twentieth-century "high-modernist" states harnessed nature to buttress their own legitimacy and eradicate complexity and difference. Scott suggests that states' efforts to render legible and simplify physical spaces -ranging from the Normalbaum forests of Germany to the collective villages of Tanzania -constituted an integral part of these states' authoritarian projects to refashion and "improve" society as a whole. the plants. 16 In all these cases, experts designed programs that both altered peasant practices and shifted the purpose of nature to meet the goal of social development in a way more consonant with than destructive of local environments. Another cultivation metaphor equated well-tended forests with physical and economic wellbeing. In some cases, officials suggested that forests could serve as a fount of wealth in rural communities. Remarking on a fruit tree planting enterprise sponsored by the Forestry Department, for example, one forester argued that the "intense cultivation of fruit trees now being propagated will clearly create new sources of employment that will provide real stimulus for the campesino masses." Likewise, the Department declared in 1938 that that it had revamped its management policies in order to "develop the economic capacity of the campesino class." 27 In other cases, the Cárdenas administration equated forests with public health itself. Forestry
Department employees called for the establishment of local nurseries alongside streets and playgrounds and described them as "true belts of beauty, promoting health and hygienic recreation, transforming the sad and desolate aspects of our cities, and promoting civic culture." 28 The Department facilitated reforestation efforts by building a system of tree nurseries that provisioned schools, ejidos, roads, and parks around the country. By 1939, foresters, horticulturists, and bureaucrats had established an orderly confederation of ninety-two national nurseries. This system disseminated more than three million plants from two main nurseries in Mexico City, Viveros de Coyoacán and Nativitas, to scores of local propagators.
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The Cardenista "garden," then, was not a decoration but a fully reorganized society in which rural communities could use nature to shake off the stigma of marginality and take on a more active role in the economic life of the nation. It divided the landscape into different spaces dedicated to the production of particular goods and products based both on the needs of the 27 "Impulso a la arboricultura frutal en Tepoztlán, Morelos" Protección a la Naturaleza nation and the particular qualities of the land. It emphasized lines of connection-like roads, warehouses, nurseries, and irrigation works-to strengthen the reliance of rural functions on each other. Like the a well organized garden, the productivity of Cardenista social landscaping was not measured only in terms of short-term output; it was intended to cultivate rural prosperity over the long term as well.
Forests, as we have already seen, constituted particularly privileged sites of Cardenista social landscaping. While most scientists regarded forests as uniquely vulnerable ecosystems and sometimes imagined a woodlands unencumbered by peasant communities, most of them regarded the (tightly managed) peasant forestry sector as eminently practical. Nor did they advocate for a strict preservationist regime that would put an end to all production and return the forests to an imagined state of pristine wilderness. Such a goal was both "absurd and Yet there remained the problem of how to achieve such a goal in the context of an expanding land reform that placed vast forests into the hands of rural people, whose productive and intellectual competencies provoked no small apprehension among forestry experts. The most prominent worrier was Miguel Ángel de Quevedo, a distinguished, European-educated civil engineer and the nation's foremost advocate for forest conservation, whom Cárdenas somewhat incongruously selected to lead the newly created Department of Forestry, Fish, and Game. 32 Quevedo regarded rural productive practices as primitive at best and savage at worst. 33 He did not discount the possibility that education might teach rural people "to respect and love trees," but he usually advocated for a more direct approach of "fortress conservation" that denied rural people access to the woods. 34 Before taking the helm at the Forestry Department, Quevedo repeatedly proposed that forests be exempted from the land reform altogether. At a minimum, he believed that Mexico should follow the example of more "advanced nations, where the villagers
[pueblos] in forests are legally defined as minors" and he set his sights on running a forest service that managed production in accordance with "a technical plan of organized in a position to manage all the nation's woods on public, private, and ejidal land. 36 Led by Quevedo, the Forestry Department set out to categorize forests into regions where (scientifically regulated) production could take place while setting aside areas as preserves of one sort or another. The Forestry Department also required rural communities to form producers' cooperatives intended to keep the wealth generated from logging inside the community and facilitate supervision of local production. Like the other projects of social landscaping, these initiatives made surprisingly little distinction between the environment and those who lived in it.
It constituted part of a startlingly ambitious vision whose dimensions this article can only begin to sketch out. We begin with an overview of some of the most noteworthy efforts to transform society and the landscape before returning to the forestlands for an idea of how technocrats tried to implement their project, at times with the consent of rural people but other times over their vehement objections.
Land Reform and Rural Development
Land reform was the signature project of Cardenismo, and the one with which scholars feel most familiar. Cárdenas famously expanded the redistribution of land mandated by Article 27, and by the end of his administration 14,680 ejidos accounted for 15 percent of the national territory, encompassing around a fifth of the nation's forests and nearly half of the land in agricultural production. 37 Haciendas ranging from the patrimonial estates of southern Yucatán to the highly capitalized agribusinesses of large northern states gave way to a patchwork of ejidal land reform parcels. agricultural production" designed to feed the nation. 40 From this point of view, it made little sense to distinguish between the organization of ejidal labor and the organization of the productive landscape. One could not proceed without the other.
The land reform process literally functioned to fix boundaries of community. The central documents needed to formally establish an ejido included a formal census of the potential beneficiaries and a survey of the lands. Naturally, these elements fit with the Cardenista vision of a planned and well-organized landscape free from property disputes and inefficient uses of land.
The imperative to create a bounded and planned productive environment went far beyond simply turning land over to peasants. The Cardenista state intended to provide -or foist upon -rural communities the credit, planning, communications, and irrigation necessary to make rural communities maximally productive, mapped and planned.
The cover of the 1941-42 almanac of the Agrarian Department took this rationalizing aesthetic to its logical extreme. It portrayed a huarache-clad campesino surrounded by lush corn stalks and preternaturally large sheaves of wheat, gazing delightedly at an idealized map of an indigenous rural community. This was far from the first time that cartographers had used maps to reify the country and depict it as a more-or-less isomorphic national space comprised of interlocking parts. 41 But this map was different. It did not purport to describe a real place.
Instead, it represented an idealized picture of how a rural community might spatially organize its use of the land. The "map" included ejidal and common lands, an irrigation district, grazing land, a communal forest, and a national park. It set each district off from each other using a distinct The Cárdenas administration took advantage of this institutional legacy to construct a water policy that would both rationalize resource use and put it at the service of the land reform.
The administration prioritized small-scale irrigation projects for lands that grew corn and wheat, The Cardenistas put more emphasis on the study and regulation of fisheries. A Japanese expert, Yoshiichi Matsui was hired and charged with studying and rebuilding fish populations in Michoacán's fabled Lake Pátzcuaro. 58 In tandem with the efforts to build sustainable populations, Department employees hoped to change cultural perceptions of fish and proclaimed the "need to teach the public that consumption of fish is not damaging to your health, but to the contrary, quite beneficial." 59 The Forestry Department also inherited oversight of a commercial and scientific expedition to lay the groundwork for developing Pacific coast fisheries, in which two Japanese trawlers netted fish while Mexican officials onboard studied their habitats and began mapping out ecological zones on the western seaboard. 60 To the Forestry Department, such a project would allow it to expand its network of fishing cooperatives whose members would "take advantage of the practical lessons given by the Japanese experts, as well as the advice and instruction of the Department… to familiarize themselves with systems of rational exploitation" of marine resources. 61 Not all of these initiatives bore fruit. Matsui's efforts to develop the pearl industry of Baja California, for example, nearly destroyed coastal oyster beds before World War II put an end to the nascent scientific collaboration with Japan.
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The administration also developed new uses for the rural credit bank (the Banco de Crédito Agrícola) inherited like so much else from the Calles regime. The bank had done little to support the land reform program since its founding in 1926. In its first years of operation, it primarily lent to highly capitalized producers and directed less than a fifth of its loans to ejidatarios and producers' cooperatives. Most loans went to landowners with a proven ability to repay, particularly the owners of the rich, well-irrigated land around Delicias, Chihuahua and in La Laguna. In 1935, the Cárdenas administration tried to end these practices, breaking it into two separate entities: the Banco Nacional de Crédito Agrícola (BNCA), theoretically charged with providing credit and technical assistance to irrigation districts and private landholders and the Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal (BNCE) dedicated, eponymously, to ejidal development.
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Although the Secretary of Agriculture had its own, much-touted extension service, in practice the development banks took the lead and sent the agronomists and community development specialists to the ejidal sector. More than any other single group, these experts brought a Mexican gospel of efficiency to campesinos, not all of who appreciated the gesture. modernizing agricultural sector. As the key advocates of Cardenista rational resource use, they tried to cajole campesinos into growing new crops and varieties, and ultimately to create a mental map more in tune with the idealized cartography of production depicted above. 65 These efforts rarely succeeded, yet they did plant the seeds of a rationalizing and legible productive aesthetic. This was particularly true in the forests, where bank officials, often in uneasy alliance with foresters, struggled to bring rural folk in line with their vision of a well ordered and scientifically managed ecosystem.
Social Landscaping in the Forest
Cardenistas saw the entire countryside as their canvas for social landscaping, but they viewed forests as particularly crucial repositories of natural wealth that, if properly managed, would provide a wide array of services. If agriculture drew its wealth out of the environment, in the view of these scientists, forests returned resources-particularly water, fertile soil, and a stable climate-that agriculturalists depended upon. Not only were forests able to provide stability, forests were owned, managed, and used by diverse social groups. This made forests culturally and economically ripe for many types of investment and full of potential productivity.
The Cardenista vision made accommodations for private landowners and industrialists, and they did not forgo aims of larger profit and resource exploitation, but reserved the greatest benefits for rural communities. Cardenistas did not propose to wrest the forests away from peasants but instead to reform their inhabitants, to keep them on the land, and to supervise them with rational scientists, foresters, and other experts.
Driven by the twin demands of agrarian reform and national reconstruction, Cardenistas resolved to include forests in the process of social landscaping, alongside irrigation districts and 65 Cotter, Troubled Harvest, 81-123. well-communicated and funded agricultural plots. Cardenistas used forests as the setting for such policies because of the intergenerational scale of forest growth, the vast decline in forest extensions despite the prodigious woods that remained, and the benefits-from lumber, to turpentine, to shade-that forests provided to other rural enterprises. Reformers aimed at rehabilitating lands (particularly those around Mexico City) through reforestation projects and rescuing the remaining woods from inefficient squander. Such efforts rang with a religious tone and reinforced the connections between human life and forests. As one forester explained, "
[since] the forests make possible and nurture our brief existence on Earth, we are obligated, after venerating and blessing them, to conserve them. If we do not, it would be suicidal." equally as much as the extensive stands of unused, "virgin" woods that, in the words of one early twentieth century forester were "composed of trees past their maturity and with manifest tendencies of decline." 67 Above all, scientists worried that campesinos lacked the knowledge and intellectual capacity, i.e., the cultura, to play a role in the formation of a rationalized landscape.
Foresters such as Quevedo recoiled at the "irrational" way that peasants used the woods, thanks
to "the lack of care and absence of respect that they bestow on the trees, the damage that they frequently cause, and their disastrous logging that leads to the destruction of forests." 68 Forestry experts were particularly eager to expand protected districts, such as national parks and forestry reserves, beyond the reach of the commercial loggers and ejidatarios, who they believed disregarded legal strictures on forest use and tended to "carry out logging in a ruinous fashion."
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Yet these foresters recognized that the land reform had progressed too far to turn around.
Moreover, foreign corporations still held some of their Porfirian-era concessions, and indigenous communities still possessed significant, though often degraded commons. To confront this onthe-ground reality, foresters elected the next-best thing: a carefully planned landscape that assigned a proper use (or non-use) to forests, depending on their ecological characteristics.
The logical starting point was to survey the woods on a national scale and categorize them into discrete zones based on scientific guidelines about which land should be placed into sustainable production and which should remain strictly protected or exempt from logging altogether. Foresters initially hoped it would be possible to create a comprehensive inventory and then systematically classify protected areas. documented the creation of many of these protected zones, yet it had little ability to patrol them effectively or, in some cases, even to inform people living within them about the new regulatory regimes. Nor could it keep close track of the forests within ejidal boundaries. The result was a largely imagined regulatory cartography intended to promote conservation and rational use but which ultimately was only comprehensible to the experts who created it.
Most of the laws that the Cárdenas administration needed to create a more rational and legible forested landscape were on the books well before 1934 as forestry legislation had grown up during the previous four decades. 72 Following a familiar trajectory, the first preservationist laws appeared on the books during Porfiriato, expanded in the years before the revolution, and then peaked during the revolutionary period. The Calles administration passed the comprehensive Forestry Code of 1926 that proposed to "regularize the conservation, restoration, propagation, and utilization" of forest resources and in this way, the Forestry Code created a set of rules that allowed foresters to manage all woodlands-private, public, communal-throughout the nation. 73 The regulations had provisions to protect ecosystem functions associated with forests, including air filtration and water capture, and hence afford a measure of protection against desiccation and soil erosion. The Code also allowed the state a stake in profitable forest production through taxes, permit fees, and user payments for forestry studies. The law required all logging operations from modest ejidal cuts to large-scale commercial ventures, to file satisfactory plans for harvest before they could receive logging permits. Perhaps most notably, it contained a stipulation (barely enforced until Cárdenas took office) that made producers' cooperatives the only entity legally able to carry out logging operations on communal lands, 72 In addition from the examples described in the previous section, see the case of oil discussed in Alan Knight, "The Politics of the Expropriation" p. what made him exceptional was how closely he followed it and how often it served as a guide.
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On the whole, the Six-Year Plan promised to redesign the Mexican environment by stabilizing federally managed natural resources. The designs for social landscaping within the plan epitomized the era's overwhelming commitment to political empowerment. At the meetings where the plan was composed, the authors, consisting of representatives from each state, explained the need to create access to resources and foster avenues for profit from those resources. Luis León, an agrarian engineer from Chihuahua and Secretary of the PNR, articulated the responsibility the state had to campesinos. "The Revolution has produced ejidal agriculture, 74 Ibid, and Boyer, "Revolución y paternalismo ecológico" 105. 75 Luis Javier Garrido, as well as small-and medium-scale agriculture," he declared. " [T] hese campesinos are the bedrock [sostén] of the revolutionary government, which has the obligation to create an economic system that protects and supports them." 76 The trick then was making sure that increased access also resulted in increased productivity and this quickened the need to root the masses in their rural setting. León deepened his argument, explaining that the issue of land restitution was "not simply to give out land, but rather to provide to the people [pueblos] who need them." 77 Redistributing lands alone was not sufficient to reach the PNR objectives because neither people nor farms lived in isolation. The final Declaration of Principles signed by all delegates at the conference explained the ways it was necessary to employ natural resources to move the country forward. These were spelled out in three clear steps: increased production;
conservation of the "sources of wealth"; and a more equitable distribution of income among producers. 78 In these ways, the Six-Year Plan and its formulation underwrote structural reforms and a transition into an era of a discretely managed economy with the promise that the new system would provide a fairer manner of exploitation for land and laborers alike.
Remaking the Woods
Despite its egalitarian rhetoric, the regime of forest regulation that grew up during the Cárdenas administration promoted paternalistic assumptions, dismissed campesino expertise, and privileged foreign techniques-and sometimes even species-over native practices. 79 The process of social landscaping reinforced a tutelary role for state, one that educated citizens to be loyal to the nation (not the Church, the patria chica, or any other allegiance) and one that strengthened the superiority and supposed benevolence of federal centralization, all of which resonated more with foresters than with campesinos. 80 Even so, rural people developed complex and occasionally collaborative orientations toward the reforms. At times, they drew the forestry bureaucracy into local conflicts and obliged officials at the local and national level to serve as reluctant arbiters over the use of forests. At other moments, rural people invoked the Cardenistas' own populist rhetoric to demand access to woods that foresters wished to keep out of production.
Despite these points of friction, the rural people -or at least a privileged subset of themdiscovered some elements of the regulatory regime they could adapt to their needs. Foresters Although foresters reminded residents that the park's woods remained unavailable for use, these restrictions alone did not change campesino practices. Juárez began his request by explaining that "in order to sustain our local economy, we have been making charcoal from the dead wood belonging to our community." 83 He went on to justify the breaking of forestry regulations by explaining that an intermediary, Loreto Rodríguez, had approached him and offered to buy his charcoal. Juárez admitted that he knew it broke the law to sell his goods to a contratista (broker) who had not made the charcoal himself and whose trade merely encouraged villagers to illegally cut wood within the park. But Juárez justified his behavior by saying that his community limited its own production and in any case had no other source of income. Juárez's community suggested that foresters should accommodate peasant woodcutters because they made artisanal rather than industrial use of the woods, as they had done for generations. By denouncing
Rodríguez as a scheming outsider with no regard for the forests and arguing that his community had the capacity to conserve the forests, Juárez placed his community in an elevated position that afforded them greater considerations from the Forestry Department.
Rather than validate the foresters' calls for conservation over the campesinos' pleas for survival, Cárdenas compromised, and the conciliation reinforced rather than reduced federal authority. In response to claims like Juárez's, Cárdenas altered the existing law to allow the minimal use of forest products and he granted small-scale charcoal makers the right to continue selling on a very limited scale. This reform allowed destitute people to harvest wood products as long as the weekly value did not exceed fifteen pesos. If they were found marketing forest products in excess of this amount, the wood seller and the consumer were both subjected to fines. 84 The compromise then came between campesinos who wanted small, sustainable use and foresters who had declared universal conservation; the enterprising outsider with no ecological 87 The cooperatives served as a mechanism through which federal agents could fix a community onto a natural resource, intertwining their fates. The logic of this system held that stitching groups of forest workers together ameliorated local competition and forced campesinos 85 Adalberto Cortés, Liga Nacional Campesina "Úrsulo Galván" AGN-LCR 554 exp. 501/8. 86 However, not all forestry cooperatives had access to viable stands of timber, nor were they necessarily conflict free. In communities with access to healthy forests, cooperatives created new subsistence opportunities and allowed some communities to put the landscape into pesos a week, before deducting cooperative fees. 89 The development of this market and its reliance on the already extant trees helped transformed an activity previously stigmatized as a last resort for the destitute, into a profitable community industry. 90 Yet, local disagreements perforated the façade of cooperation as lucrative gains fed the very sort of village intrigue that federal officials had hoped to overcome. The conflicts abounded.
Tepoztecos disputed with neighboring communities over the legal forest boundary. 91 Villagers not adept at making charcoal detested the arrival of outsiders, from as far away as Toluca, who came to burn their forests. Many people in the community bridled at the idea of cutting trees for charcoal, and local politics became divided around the question of how rapidly the cooperative should exploit the woods and how such profits should be distributed. Some members hid clandestinely manufactured charcoal in their houses and discretely attempted to avoid cooperative permits, fees, and restrictions. Others denounced these clandestine and subversively individualistic activities. 92 Nevertheless, the cooperative did provide an important source of employment despite the unfortunate politicization of its local administration. Most dramatically, the cooperative's president, whom many accused of political bossism (caciquismo) and other shenanigans was dragged from his home and executed in 1935. 93 Thus, while cooperatives provided a means of subsistence for villagers, they could also reinforce local power networks and cronyism, with predictably dire social and ecological implications. parks that all citizens could visit but he also envisioned rural people's livelihoods taking place in the forests. Charcoal and lumber cooperatives developed to solidify communities' rights to communal property by putting them to sustainable use. Some forests even went into production as sources of pine resin for turpentine. In the Cardenista vision, the environment never became a bourgeois oasis. It was emphatically a place where rural people lived and worked. They envisioned it as a focus of reform, a repository of value, and a site of empowerment rather than a passive, uniform, and stable backdrop.
If the rural landscape proved the location for Cardenista social change, rural society was the primary focus of attention. Many campesinos unenthusiastically received attention from 99 Emily Wakild, "An Unexpected Environment: National Park Creation, Resource Custodianship, and the Mexican Revolution" forthcoming manuscript.
federal reformers but others readily engaged the opportunities that a focus on rural production afforded them. Cooperatives, ejidos, and even parks aimed to keep people on their land by expanding rural production. In contrast to other countries in this period, this social transformation relied upon keeping people laboring in the natural world, not excluding or evicting them from their reliance upon it. Such a conception proved imperfect. At times, foresters disdained and dismissed campesino practices, communities descended into conflict, and enterprising intermediaries sought to take advantage of potential sources of profit. But on the whole, the network of reforms we call social landscaping met some success in building upon and institutionalizing complimentary relationships between a government and its people and between people and nature. The philosophy guiding this new landscape involved organizing production in a sustainable way that fostered the survival and vibrancy of both nature and society.
Environmental policies unfolded with explicit attention to social obligations and seeing the environment as a locus of social interaction illuminates the commonalties among competing groups, bringing more actors into the story of reform.
Social landscaping required a great deal of systematic and rational planning. More than the genius of visionaries and politicians, such large-scale plans required the participation of bureaucrats and experts willing to work directly with rural people. Some of them had more sensitivity than others to the rural communities into which they intruded. In the aggregate, these officials' program of social landscaping sought to join social and natural communities and make 
